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Introduction
Medicine is a less exact science than many believe; it is
fraught with a myriad of uncertainties that can make decision
making in women with breast cancer, or women who are at
high genetic risk for it, very difficult. Even the best information
available may be inadequate, with limited data about
effectiveness or trade-offs between benefits and harms. The
quality of any evidence concerning treatment risks is ultimately
dependent on the veracity of good clinical trial data, followed
by careful and comprehensive systematic monitoring of
therapeutic endeavours in the clinic. All decisions women may
make, from consenting to diagnostic tests, choice of surgery
or systemic treatments, to consideration of lifestyle changes,
are made on the basis of implicit or explicit judgements about
the risk or perceived benefit/harm ratios. Patients must
consider their own personal risk for either developing breast
cancer and/or having a recurrence of their disease, and then
balance these risks against the harms and benefits of various
screening procedures or treatments. Inaccurate risk
perceptions may lead to suboptimal decision making, so all
health care professionals need to be aware of the impact that
their own communication may have on patients’ understanding
and on some of the psychological issues that influence the lay
populations’ beliefs and behaviours.
Numeracy and understanding of risks
Research shows that innumeracy affects both sexes and that
most lay populations lack the minimal skills needed to inter-
pret health education materials. Surprisingly, this is not just a
matter of education, because even among educated samples
fewer than half were able to convert a proportion such as
1:1,000 to a percentage (0.1%) and only 70% could convert
20/100 into a percentage [1].
There is a vast difference between the estimated magnitude
of certain risks, perceptions, interpretations, acceptance of
these and subsequent behaviours. Telling an individual that
they have a risk of 1.3 in 10,000 compared with a general
population risk of 1 in 10,000 does not concern most people,
whereas saying that they have a 30% greater risk than the
average person of succumbing to a disease is perceived as
very risky, even though both statements are the same. A
further difficulty for lay populations is that inherently
probabilistic risk information is often converted into definitive
or declarative statements that can influence decision making
about screening or treatment.
Absolute and relative risks
Many of the new treatments for breast cancer can look much
better than the standard therapy, depending on how they are
described. A 50% reduction in recurrence is not so impressive
when it is pointed out that this only applies to the 5% who
actually stood to gain any benefit from the drug. Absolute and
relative risks are extremely difficult for patients to grasp. Even
more troubling is the fact that many health care professionals
themselves find the differences between absolute and relative
risks difficult to understand and explain [2].
Decision-making
We like to think that before making a decision about any form
of treatment or screening women will first assemble all of the
possible information provided by doctors, specialist nurses
and others, consider these and make an option appraisal of
the costs and benefits, and finally make a rational choice.
However, many factors will influence this, including the
personality characteristics of a woman, her anxiety state, her
preconceived ideas and expectations, and how the facts have
been presented. Real-world decision makers are rarely
rational - they may use unreliable sources of information, use
minimal heuristics to simplify the facts and figures, and find
solutions that provide a fit with these.
Risk appraisal and understanding probabilities
There have been many studies published since the seminal
work of cognitive psychologists Tversky and Kahneman [3],
which showed that both lay people and trained health care
professionals who are familiar with statistics use minimal
heuristics to simplify situations. People often dichotomize
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actions, behaviours and treatments into polar extremes, such
as ‘safe/dangerous’ or ‘good/bad’. Thus, vitamins may be
seen as good things, although we know that overdosing can
kill. Likewise, many people, not just idealistic vegans and
vegetarians, see meat as bad despite its nutritional benefits.
Another important aspect of irrational or faulty risk appraisal is
that judgements are made independent of dose, so for
example oxygen is seen as good, despite the fact that 100%
can be extremely harmful in some respiratory conditions or
when given to premature babies. Lay populations also tend to
put too much emphasis on anecdotal but familiar experiences,
such as the apocryphal friend or relative who smoked 60
cigarettes a day and drank every night but still lived until their
90s without a day off work.
Communication about probabilities is made even more
complicated by the fact that people prefer absolutes, for
example ‘without an operation death is certain’ or ‘this
treatment is completely safe’ [4].
Some of the common errors seen include a general failure to
understand that probabilities in a set must include all possi-
bilities; in other words, for a high-risk woman contemplating
mammographic screening, the percentage chance of finding
a cancer and the chance of a cancer being absent must add
up to 100%. Few appreciate that probabilities of independent
events must be multiplied not added. Conditional probability
reasoning is another common confusion; the conditional
probability of event X given event Y is not necessarily equal to
the probability of event Y given X. The probability of breast
cancer in a patient with BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutation is
around 70%, but the probability that a woman with breast
cancer also has the gene mutation is substantially lower.
Observations of lay populations’ use of figures show that a
term such as 50% may be used in rather non-numeric terms,
indicating just general uncertainty, a lack of precision, some-
thing that may or may not happen.
Probabilities are often just too abstract for understanding
and/or decisions. Few of us could say what 1:100,000, for
example, means in relation to other common risk behaviours.
In fact the risk for being murdered is 1:100,000, death
playing soccer 1:50,000, and dying in a road accident over a
50-year period of driving 1:85. The ‘risk’ for getting three
balls in the UK National Lottery is 1:11 [5], which is rather
similar to the lifetime risk of getting breast cancer.
Although we have an understanding of all of these events and
the ability to quote the statistics given, perceptions of
personal vulnerability to them differ widely and may be
complicated further by framing effects.
Framing effects
Context in everyday life influences our perception of sight,
smell and sound. An aroma subjected to a person shown a
picture of a French restaurant and a trolley of interesting
cheeses provokes a neutral or pleasing response; that same
aroma applied when people are shown a photo of dirty
laundry, in particular socks, produces revulsion. Likewise,
context and framing affect thinking and decision making. Take
a hypothetical example of 100 patients with lung cancer that
could be treated either by surgery or radiotherapy. The
information could be framed in terms of survival - 90 patients
will live through the surgery and 34 will still be alive at
5 years. It could also be framed in terms of mortality - 10
patients will die during surgery and a further 56 will be dead
within 5 years. Surgery is seen as a less attractive option
when mortality framing is used, and these effects are as large
with physicians as with lay people. Some consequences of
this are that treatments, including chemoprevention, may be
accepted or rejected on the basis of the way in which they
are framed. Advertisers are well aware of these facts and
manipulate their presentation of data accordingly.
Implications for women at high risk for breast
cancer
A woman at high genetic risk for breast cancer has
essentially four options: do nothing, engage in regular
surveillance and screening, undergo bilateral prophylactic
mastectomy (BPM), or enrol in a chemoprevention trial. These
options have fairly major implications, and good quality
genetic counselling is crucial to ensure that decisions are
made based on the best quality information and true appre-
ciation of the potential harms, as well as an understanding of
the putative gains and risk reduction.
Some interesting results were seen in a quantitative [6] and
qualitative [7] study of 143 women with risk levels between
1:2 and 1:4 who were offered BPM. Seventy-nine women
opted for surgery, 64 chose regular surveillance and 11
deferred any decision. Most women could quote verbatim
what they had been told about risk, but women choosing
surgery perceived their individual risk to be much higher than
those declining it (P < 0.005). Significantly more women
opting to undergo surgery thought it inevitable that they
would develop breast cancer (32% versus 10%; P < 0.003).
Typical quotes demonstrating this perception included “… it’s
not a case of if I get it (breast cancer) but when’. Others had
been powerfully influenced by identification with their dead
mothers; ‘My mother died when she was 34 and my sister
when she was 32. I’m 34 next year so I want the surgery’ or ‘I
know that they said it isn’t certain that I will get it too but I’m
the one who looks like my mother.’
When psychological morbidity of the women was examined
some further differences emerged. The high anxiety and
depression seen before surgery declined at 6 months and
18 months in those who opted for BPM, whereas
psychological morbidity did not change over time for women
choosing surveillance. Personality differences between the
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resolution of some morbidity amongst the surgical group but
little in the decliners. Those opting for surgery were more
likely to have problem-focussed coping characteristics
(P = 0.03), whereas the surveillance group were more likely
to use detachment as a coping strategy (P < 0.001).
Furthermore, the decliners had higher anxiety traits than the
acceptors. Consequently, the more problem-focussed
acceptors of BPM felt a relief of some of their anxiety after
surgery, but the decliners who tried to adopt a more ostrich-
like ‘head in the sand’ approach to things found that the
regular check ups and surveillance maintained their anxiety,
because they could not employ detachment with the constant
reminders of their high risk.
Conclusion
An understanding of the risks from breast cancer as well as
the potential harms of treatment are vitally important to
ensure appropriate decision making. There is little evidence,
even after genetic counselling, that high-risk women have an
accurate understanding, with personality and other factors
influencing perception and decisions. Health care
professionals must ensure that they themselves are not being
influenced by framing effects and the presentation of data
before trying to communicate treatment options to patients.
Finally, more research is needed into interventions that make
communication about risk both easier and more accurate [8].
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